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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 05-3824
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
MAURICE FRANCIS FOLEY,
a/k/a Maurice Hoover,
a/k/a Clarence Lee Oday, II,
a/k/a Luke,
      Maurice Francis Foley,
                                    Appellant.
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(No. 04-cr-00036)
District Judge: Hon. Sean J. McLaughlin 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 25, 2007
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, FUENTES and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges.
__________
(Filed:  February 27, 2007)
OPINION OF THE COURT
2CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Maurice Foley pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to distribute marijuana and a related
weapons offense and the District Court sentenced him to 330 months imprisonment. 
Foley appeals his conviction and sentence, contending that the District Court improperly
denied a motion to suppress physical evidence and that the District Court failed to
articulate the reasons for its sentence, violating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1).  We reject both
arguments and we will affirm.  
I.
Because we write only for the parties, we keep the facts brief.  
A Pennsylvania police officer heard from a previously reliable informant that
“Mo” Foley, a wanted parole violator, was staying in Saegertown, Pennsylvania on
weekends.  The informant stated that Foley might be involved in manufacturing and
distributing methamphetamine.  The officer reported this information to state parole
agents and accompanied three agents to the property described by the informant.  The
property contained two structures, a residence and a two-level garage.  
Before entering onto the property, officers observed three vehicles drive up and
park near the garage.  Officers became concerned that they did not have an appropriate
number of people to attempt apprehension, so they requested, and received, two
additional officers.  With four officers posted around the property, three officers
approached the residence and knocked on the door.  A woman answered and told the
1  The District Court found the search of the residence improper, rejecting the
government’s argument that consent had been obtained or that a protective sweep was
necessary.  Excising the evidence found in the residence from the probable cause
analysis, the District Court concluded that the search warrant remained valid because the
evidence from the garage provided probable cause.  In the garage, officers had observed a
triple beam scale, many “ziploc-style” bags, a compact disc with white powder on it, a
bag of green vegetable matter, a box of marijuana seeds and a 12-gauge shotgun.  In
Foley’s pockets, officers found a bag of methamphetamine and a bag of marijuana. 
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officers that just she and her girlfriend were present.  Her girlfriend informed officers that
her boyfriend was in the garage.  Neither admitted that they knew Foley’s location. 
Officers then went to the garage and knocked on its front door.  Just before they
entered the garage, someone remotely started the engine and lights of one of the three
vehicles parked on the property.  A man opened the door and officers observed another
man inside, climbing down a ladder from the garage’s second level.  After restraining the
two men inside the garage, and being told that other officers apprehended Foley outside
the back door of the garage, two officers looked around both levels of the garage for
additional people.  In so doing, they observed drug paraphernalia and a shot gun.
Officers then returned to the residence, and searched it.  Based on evidence found
in the garage and the residence, officers executed a search warrant on the next day.1  The
evidence obtained in the garage, in the residence, and on Foley when he was
apprehended, supported charges of conspiracy to distribute and possess-with-intent-to-
distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 841
(b)(1)(B)(vii), and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking offense
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
4Foley moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the garage.  The District
Court concluded the evidence was admissible because the tip that led officers to the
property was reliable, the protective sweep of the garage was justified, and the contraband
seized as a result of the sweep was in plain view.  
Foley pleaded guilty to marijuana distribution and the weapons offense, but
retained his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.  On appeal, Foley does
not dispute that the evidence was in plain view, but he argues officers were not justified
to look in the garage because they did not have reasonable suspicion to enter onto the
property and, once there, they did not have adequate reason to engage in a protective
sweep.  
We will first address Foley’s arguments regarding the outcome of the suppression
hearing, and then turn to his request that we remand for re-sentencing.  We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
I.  
“We review a District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to
the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
application of the law to those facts.”  United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207, 211 (3d
Cir. 2005).  “Under the clearly erroneous standard, a finding of fact may be reversed on
appeal only if it is completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or bears no rational
relationship to the supporting data.” American Home Products Corp. v. Barr Laboratories,
Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370-71 (3d Cir. 1987). 
5A. 
Law enforcement officers do not need probable cause or a warrant before
searching parolees and premises they are on – reasonable suspicion will suffice.  United
States v. Baker, 221 F.3d 438, 443-44 (3d Cir. 2000);  United States v. Hill, 967 F.2d 902,
908-09 (3d Cir. 1992).  “To decide whether reasonable suspicion exists, we consider the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer has a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”  United States v. Williams, 417 F.3d
373, 376 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Foley argues that the informant’s tip did not provide officers with reasonable
suspicion.  We disagree.  This informant had proven reliable in the past and his
information was specific enough in this instance to indicate reliability again.  True,
officers went to the Saegertown property on a Thursday even though the informant had
indicated Foley was staying in Saegertown on weekends, but officers needed either
reasonable suspicion that Foley himself would be present at the time they searched the
property or reasonable suspicion that evidence of Foley’s parole violations would be
found.  See Hill, 967 F.2d at 911.  Foley acknowledges as much.  Appellant’s Br. at 23-
24.  Even if Foley was not in Saegertown on weekdays, evidence of his suspected parole
violations (here, drug manufacturing) could be found.  
Foley challenges the District Court’s finding that the “description of the premises,
as described by the informant, was subsequently checked out and the configuration of the
structures on the premises were consistent therewith.”  App. at 256.  After reviewing the
6record, we cannot say this finding is clearly erroneous.  The officer who received the tip
testified that the informant provided him with a general description of the property where
Foley was staying – “something that would be easily identified once we were on that
road” – and the officer stated that the description proved accurate. App. at 99-100.  Foley
admits that the description was accurate.  Appellant’s Br. at 25.  Because the record
supports the District Court’s findings, we will not disturb them.  Nor can we find reason
to disagree with the District Court’s conclusion that the totality of the circumstances
provided reasonable suspicion for officers to enter onto the Saegertown property.  
B.
Foley argues that even if officers had reasonable suspicion to enter onto the
property, they did not have justification to sweep the garage after Foley’s apprehension. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “an in-home arrest puts the officer at the
disadvantage of being on his adversary’s ‘turf.’”  Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 333
(1990) (“An ambush in a confined setting of unknown configuration is more to be feared
than it is in open, more familiar surroundings.”).  The same danger can arise from
arresting a suspect just outside a home.  Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 824 (3d Cir.
1997).  In striking a balance with the privacy interests of the Fourth Amendment, the
protective sweep doctrine allows “a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an
arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.”  Id. at 327.  A
protective sweep must be “justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is
harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”  Id. at 336.  It also must
7be restricted to the areas from which the suspect’s confederates could launch an attack. 
Id. at 334. 
Here, the District Court concluded the sweep was justified in part because officers
observed drug paraphernalia before they looked for people hiding on the second level of
the garage.  Foley argues that this finding is clearly erroneous, but we disagree.  The
officer who conducted the sweep stated, “I observed, before I went upstairs, I observed a
triple beam scale, I observed a disc with white power on it.”  App. at 201 (emphasis
added).  With testimonial evidence to support the District Court’s finding, there is no
basis to conclude the finding is clearly erroneous.  Moreover, the circumstances justified
a sweep even if the drugs were not observed until after officers returned to the ground
floor of the garage.  Even though officers did not have direct indication that someone else
was lurking above them, “the purpose of a protective sweep is to protect agents from
concealed threats.”  United States v. Winston, 444 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2006)
(emphasis added).  Officers had articulable justifications to suspect a concealed threat:
they saw three vehicles pull up to the property, but they were initially told only two
people were present when they inquired at the residence; a vehicle started remotely as
they knocked on the garage door, startling them and suggesting someone was trying to
make a quick exit; upon entering the garage, officers encountered two people, one of
whom was climbing down a ladder from the loft level; and while officers were in the
garage, other officers apprehended Foley behind the garage, in an apparent escape
8attempt.  Under these conditions, officers were justified in looking in the garage for
additional individuals who posed a danger to them. 
It is possible for officers to search beyond the confines of a sweep, even if a sweep
is initially justified.  As the Supreme Court emphasized in Buie, a protective sweep can
“last[] no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any
event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises.”  Buie, 494
U.S. at 335-36.  Here, officers testified to the brief nature and limited scope of the sweep. 
This is not a case in which the government failed to provide facts regarding the brevity of
the search.  Cf. United States v. Akrawi, 920 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Because the
government failed to establish these facts, we will not presume that  the sweep was short
and that it occurred immediately after arresting [defendant].”).  Reviewing the record, we
are satisfied that this sweep was appropriately tailored to its purposes.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Foley’s motion to
suppress. 
II.
Foley next argues that the District Court failed to articulate reasons for imposing
its sentence.  Foley’s plea agreement waived the right to appeal his sentence, but Foley
argues that whether the District Court properly articulated its sentencing rationale falls
within an exception to the waiver.  The agreement retained Foley’s right to appeal if the
9“sentence exceed[ed] the applicable statutory limits set forth in the United States Code.” 
App. at 299.  Because a sentencing court is statutorily required to articulate its reasoning
according to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), Foley argues he can raise a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
3553 on appeal.  But 18 U.S.C. § 3553 does not provide the statutory maximum to which
the agreement refers.  The logical reading of the agreement suggests that the “applicable
statutory limit” is the maximum punishment explicitly authorized by the United States
Code for the offense to which Foley pleaded guilty.  See 21 U.S.C. § 841.  While Foley
would have had a right to appeal if his sentence exceeded that statutory maximum, the
text of the plea agreement suggests that Foley waived his § 3553 argument.  
Although the text of the agreement indicates Foley waived his appeal, an
unknowing or involuntary waiver will not be enforced.  United States v. Khattak, 273
F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001).  “In determining whether a waiver of appeal is ‘knowing
and voluntary,’ the role of the sentencing judge is critical.”  Id. at 563.  Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure dictates that the court inquire whether the defendant
knows the scope and import of the waiver.  According to Rule 11, “the court must inform
the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands . . . the terms of any
plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the
sentence.” See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(n).  
The District Court here did not explicitly ask Foley about his waiver of appeal. 
But in this case, we cannot say the court’s failure to comply with Rule 11 established that
Foley did not knowingly enter into his agreement.  The government’s counsel described
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the agreement at the change-of-plea hearing, explaining to the court that Foley waived his
right to appeal his sentence except “if [the court’s] sentence exceed[ed] the statutory limit
or unreasonably exceed[ed] the guideline [range].” App. at 284.  Immediately after this
description of the agreement, the court asked whether Foley had time to read and review
the agreement, whether Foley had discussed it with his lawyer, and whether Foley agreed
to all of its terms and conditions.  Foley answered in the affirmative to all of these
questions. App. at 284-85.  Thus, it appears Foley did knowingly enter into the
agreement, waiving his right to appeal.  For the purposes of this not precedential opinion,
however, we will assume that the District Court’s failure to ask Foley about the
conditions of his waiver make the waiver unenforceable.  We reach the merits and will
affirm the sentence.
Foley claims that the District Court failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) in
sentencing him to 270 months for the drug charge.  Section 3553(c) requires a sentencing
court “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence,” and if
the guideline range exceed 24 months, “the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular
point within the range.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1).  The guideline range for Foley’s drug
charge was 235 to 293 months imprisonment.  App. at 310.
The District Court, here, provided “concrete reasons for its choice of sentences”
and that is adequate to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1).  See United States v. Gricco, 277
F.3d 339, 363 (3d Cir. 2002).  In particular, the court provided the following explanation
as to why it did not impose a less severe sentence:
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In my view this is a very serious offense.  It involves a
large-scale drug conspiracy.  The record reflects that the
defendant is a lifelong criminal and as far as I can tell
completely unrepentant.  The protection of the public from
further crimes is a significant consideration.  Deterrence in
cases such as this is important as well.  In addition, I have
given serious consideration to the suggested or advisory
guideline range.
. . . . And to the extent that I would disagree with
Father Peterson [who testified on behalf of the defendant] it is
simply a reflection of the fact that Father Peterson sees the
defendant through the eyes of a caring priest and friend, while
I must view him, of course, simply as a judge.
In short, in my view a significant sentence here is not
only appropriate, but necessary, to prevent this one man
criminal Tsunami from continuing to roll over this
community.  
Supp. App. at 78-79.  In sum, the court satisfied 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), and no plain
error was committed.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Foley’s conviction and sentence will be affirmed. 
